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ABSTRACT 
The automotive industry is undergoing a radical transformation. New social, technological, 
environmental and geopolitical challenges are redefining the characteristics of a saturated 
market, opening new scenarios while offering opportunities for the entry of new players. 
These challenges are bound to trigger reorganization of the global value chain between old 
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and new suppliers and car makers and their suppliers, affecting the distribution of employ-
ment, the regionalization of production and the dynamic evolution of the comparative ad-
vantage of nations.  
In this paper we address the issue of the reorganization of global value chains in the face of 
these challenges. The analysis will compare the relative position of core and peripheries in 
the North-American and European macro-regions, focusing on Mexico, which represents a 
significant case study for analysis of the impact of the digital transformation on the domestic 
value chain in an “integrated periphery”, and of trade agreements on the location policies of 
big multinationals. The dependency of the Mexican automotive industry on the strategic de-
cisions of global players is considered a factor of great vulnerability, especially in a context 
of rapid change in the patterns of consumption, technologies and international trade agree-
ments. 
For Mexico, as for European producers in the integrated and semi-peripheries, the main chal-
lenge in the near future will be posed by the radical transformation the industry is going 
through in electrical and autonomous-driving vehicles, which sees regions and players out-
side the traditional automotive clusters in the lead. The transformations taking place are 
bound to change the global structure of automotive production. The rise of new competitors 
from the emerging economies and would-be entrants from other sectors, competing in mas-
tering the new digital and software technologies, threatens the established structure of the 
industry.  
The pandemic has led to a spectacular acceleration in the process of change, while heighten-
ing uncertainty about future developments. This is why the governments of leading countries 
are joining in the race, wielding carrots and sticks in support of their industries and in the 
endeavor to encourage risk-taking and investment in research and innovation, step up e-ve-
hicle production while providing for the necessary infrastructures, and guarantee their com-
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The automotive industry is confronting deep uncertainty in a complex and ambiguous envi-
ronment (Teece, 2018). The established structure of the world industry is defined by trade 
wars, the rise of new competitors from emerging economies and would-be entrants from 
other sectors that compete to master ongoing paradigm shifts: connectivity, autonomy, shar-
ing, and electrification (referred to by the acronym CASE, created by Daimler in 2016). 
These new challenges – social, environmental, technological, and geopolitical - open new 
scenarios: while they may entail huge costs in terms of changes in production, they can also 
bring new life to a largely saturated sector. Established car manufacturers must respond to 
the dual challenge of defending their present position and preparing for an uncertain future. 
The radical transformation of the industry will affect the current structure of the whole auto-
motive value chain: it will involve different stakeholders, such as new players in battery and 
software production, and mobility end-users, require securing new key materials and capa-
bilities, and call for new public policies to ensure infrastructures.  
How these upstream, downstream and horizontal partnerships will play out in the future is 
still highly uncertain. Product commoditization and reduced value added accruing to the con-
ventional ICE drive train may dent OEMs’ [Original Equipment Manufacturers] profits. A 
highly volatile international trade environment – Brexit, adversarial US relations with China, 
the revised treaty with Canada and Mexico, a tougher American stance towards the European 
“allies” – largely fueled by the changing distribution of power among nations, exacerbates 
the uncertainty. Finally, the heavy social and economic shock due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic has added more uncertainty. Uncertainty’s impact on the automotive sector has been 
large, albeit different across producers and countries. Governments have enacted policies 
aimed at enhancing the competitive advantage of their industries, in an effort to affect the 
geographical distribution of production. 
Since the direction in which the present is evolving is uncertain, and alternative states are 
hazily defined, OEMs and their suppliers need to consider multiple hypotheses about the path 
of industry evolution in formulating their strategies. Deep uncertainty requires flexibility, 
since the price for misdiagnosing the future evolutionary or revolutionary path of the industry 
can be colossal. Their responses can put the fate of regional or national economies at stake. 
Alliances and flexible forms of collaboration (with new players and old competitors alike) 
offer a safer route as a way to share the risk (Teece et al. 2016): “to gain speed, to gain 
technological advantage, to share risk”, in Daimler chief executive Ola Kallenius’s words 
(Miller, 2020b). However, organizations’ interpretation of and response to their environment 
‘may shape the environment’ (Daft & Weick, 1984: 287): sunk costs create path-dependence, 
that’s why public policy must exert a timely and decisive role in orienting towards a socially 
desirable outcome.  
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This paper addresses the issues of the reorganization of the global value chain between old 
and new suppliers and their implications for the dynamic evolution of the comparative ad-
vantage of nations, the regionalization of production and for employment. The analysis will 
compare the relative position of core and peripheries in the North-American and European 
macro-regions.  
The research relies on specialized literature, on the analysis of trade data, and on the Mexican 
and the US data on the automotive industry presented in two companion papers (Russo et al., 
2020; Carreto, 2020). A complementary source of information, direct interviews with com-
panies, has been only partially explored. As a consequence of COVID-19, the research team 
had to stop the field work, and only the interviews already done in Mexico in 2019 (Carreto 
et al., 2019) and in 2020 will be used in the present report. In a further stage of the research, 
we plan to organize online interviews with companies in Mexico, Italy, and possibly Ger-
many. In addition, secondary sources of information and specialized newsletters (such as 
electrive.com on electric vehicles) will be explored with text mining techniques to identify 
the ongoing trends in OEMs and their Tier-1 suppliers.  
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 provides a description of the automotive 
sector before the COVID-19. It shows how the network of international trade changed over 
time by using a multilayer network analysis to single out clusters of countries and their spe-
cific trade networks. Section 3 focuses on the integrated peripheries of the North-American 
and European macro-regions and their relations with the core and semi-peripheries. The crit-
ical issue of dependence in the development process is discussed in the following section 4 
with reference to the case study of the Mexican automotive industry. Finally, Section 5 con-
siders the OEMs’ strategies to cope with the epochal transformation of the auto industry 
brought about by technological and product innovations. The last section summarizes the 
further steps in the ongoing research project.  
2. The hierarchical regionalization of production and trade 
The automotive industry is highly concentrated: in 2018 the top 20 car manufacturers em-
ployed approximately 75 per cent of all employees working at car manufacturers worldwide 
and contributed with about 88 per cent of the global vehicle production volume (Hoeft 2020). 
It is also one of the most globalized industries: historically highly clustered in core areas, 
since the late 20th century it embraced global sourcing, with peripheral areas taking on more 
prominence. The reorganization of the automotive supplier industry was made possible by 
new transportation technologies and logistical systems, and by technological and organiza-
tional changes that significantly reduced the number of suppliers and organized the remaining 
ones into tiers. The requirements of just-in-time production, along with local content and the 
request by OEMs to their main suppliers to be followed in their new locations (follow sourc-
ing) , led to the increased clustering of especially Tier-1 suppliers around assembly plants 
(Sturgeon et al, 2008; Pavlínek 2018). Global sourcing was triggered by the profit-seeking 
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strategies of firms that exploit countries’ differences in levels of developments and factor 
costs, shifting production between countries (Harvey 2014). The need to "produce where you 
sell"1 has added to the production diaspora. The geographic structure of the automotive in-
dustry is now based on the presence of large assemblers and leading (global) suppliers in all 
major markets, organized in functionally integrated macro-regional production networks. 
The competitive process results in the dynamic nature of nations’ position within automotive 
production networks, with production moving between core, semi-periphery and integrated 
periphery. 
In a companion paper, Russo et al. (2020) analyze these changes in international trade in the 
automotive global value chains using network analysis, which allows them to study the cen-
trality of given regions and countries. The paper runs the analysis at a very disaggregated 
level, to account for the contribution of the various automotive components and parts in 
structuring the relative position of countries.2 There are three main issues. The first one con-
cerns the geography of trade relations: which are the countries at the core of the international 
trade of automotive components? The second one points out which products/groups of prod-
ucts characterize the relative positions of countries. The third issue concerns the changes in 
the relative positions of countries and specializations over time.  
To answer these questions, the authors map the geography of the trade relations that emerge 
from community detection, implemented by using Infomap multilayer analysis (we refer to 
the paper for the technical explanation). The analysis considers exports of:  
- 30 commodities, grouped in four main categories: Electrical and Electric Parts, Rub-
ber and Metal Parts, Engines and Parts, Miscellaneous Parts  
- 42 reporting countries (representing approximately 98% of total world exports of au-
tomotive components and parts)  
over the period 1993-2017: three-year averages around 1993, 2008, 2013, 2017. The dataset 
is the UN Comtrade International Trade Statistics Database. 
Before summarizing the main results a note of caution is required: the network is based on 
foreign trade, thus it cannot trace the changes in production directed to serve the domestic 
market. This implies that it cannot account for the changes in the value chain that occur 
through direct production in foreign markets rather than through exports. 
An overview of the changes in the centrality of countries (weighted both by exports and 
imports passing through the node) between 1993 and 2017 is provided in Figure 1. It shows 
the expansion of the network of trade and countries’ changing importance: the appearance of 
what we will call ‘integrated peripheries’ (Mexico and CEE countries), the downsizing of 
some core countries (UK, Canada), and the entry of China.  
 
1 Ola Kallenius’s (Daimler’s chief executive) interview with the Financial Times (Miller 2020a). 
2 See Gorgoni et al (2018) for a similar analysis, discussed in Russo et al (2020). 
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Figure 1 – Network of bilateral trade of automotive components and parts, 1993 and 2017 
Nodes [countries]: size proportional to Weighted.Vertex.Degree.all; Edges [export trade flows]: thickness proportional to weight, compared 
to the maximum share in 1993 and 2017; Color of edges: 5 classes defined on the basis of the distribution of shares in 1993 and 20 
 
Source: Russo et al. 2020.  
A preliminary analysis of the weight of the 4 groups of parts and components reveals a rela-
tive stability over the entire period, with a few notable adjustments within the groups3 (Table 
A1 in Appendix).This seems to suggest a relative stability in the production technology in 
the period under consideration: the great transformations of the industry currently underway 
are not yet clearly perceptible in the composition of parts and components. 
The main descriptive statistics of the network of export flows (Table 1) show that over the 
26 years considered, the overall average number of countries (nodes) does not change signif-
icantly, while the size of the networks increases, indicating a greater number of interconnec-
tions among countries over a larger number of commodities, and, accordingly, an increase in 
the mean degree (indicating the average number of components traded). 
Table 1 – Main network features, per year 
Average data values per 
layer 1993 2003 2013 2017 
n.nodes 41.7 42.0 40.9 40.8 
Size 758.3 1088.2 1218.3 1200.9 
Mean.degree 18.1 25.9 29.0 28.6 
Source: Russo et al. 2020. 
 
3 We can mention the doubling of ‘electrical accumulators (storage battery)’ and ‘electrical lighting or signaling 
equipment’, and the almost halving of ‘reciprocating internal combustion piston engines for propelling vehicles’ 
(Table A1). 
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The data on export value shares by country (Figure 2) confirm the expansion of the network 
of trade: in 1993 five countries - Japan, USA, Germany, France and Canada - accounted for 
67.3% of total exports of automotive parts and components, and for only 44.8 per cent in 
2017. Only Germany manages to maintain its share (right panel). China, Mexico, Korea, and 
the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (marked in turquoise blue) increase their 
share as a whole from 7% in 1993 to 33.3% in 2017. 
Figure 2- Export by country, in 1993, 2013, 2003 and 2017, share of trade values, by year 
trade share by year      trade share in 1993 vs 2017 
Countries are ranked according to their 1993 total export  
share towards the 42 countries [ values at current price]  
   
Source: Russo et al 2020 
The expansion of trade is usually interpreted in the light of the increasing relevance of global 
value chains. However, the expansion of trade went hand in hand with the formation of net-
works that may or may not correspond to macro-regions. Community detection can highlight 
those groups of countries whose trade in the 30 components create relatively more connected 
trade areas (see Russo et al., 2020 for details on the methodology for the detection of clus-
ters).  
Figure 3 summarizes the results on community detection: i) horizontal bars show the share 
of each cluster, ranked in decreasing order of total Infomap flow;4 ii) vertical histograms 
display the share of each country, with the color assigned to identify the community it be-
longs to in that year; and iii) the interconnections between communities are represented in 
the graphs realized with the visualization of Infomap Network Navigator. In the graphs: clus-
ters are drawn as circles with area proportional to the intra-cluster flows; the border thickness 
 
4 The clusters are identified by color: for instance, dark blue identifies the cluster centered around Germany; grey 
the cluster centered around the US; orange for East Asia (Japan, China, Korea, etc.). 
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is proportional to exiting flows, links between nodes are aggregated on cluster level and their 
thickness is proportional to the flow between clusters.5 
The weight of the various clusters varies through time: we observe a general descending trend 
for the North-American cluster, and a continuous increase of the Asian. The ‘European’ clus-
ter loses ground between 1993 and 2013 (from 52% to 40%) to regain ground in 2017 (46%). 
The performance of this cluster is certainly due to the rise of the CEE countries (as can be 
seen from the histograms), but also to the performance of Germany: the only country, unlike 
the United States and Japan, to have managed to maintain its export share, in the face of the 




5 The relative size of edges is kept large enough to make visible all the relevant connections among clusters, there 
is no proportion between edges' size and circles' size. 
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Figure 3 - Infomap flow and network of clusters, by year 
by cluster  by country    by cluster and inter connection 
 
Source: Russo et al. (2020). 
In the end, the spatial distribution of clusters is largely associated with the geographical po-
sition of countries, so that we can speak of the organization of trade in macro-regions, some-
how redefining the ‘global’ in global value chains. The size of the circles suggests that much 
trade occurs within the macro-regions: GVCs had already been shortened by OEMs locali-
zation and follow on sourcing. Moreover, community detection can single out specific sub-
clusters - such as Thailand and the Czech Republik and their communities in 1993 – that later 






3. Integrated peripheries: Mexico and the Central European Economies (CEE) com-
pared  
Production facilities in Europe and North America have been increasingly located in periph-
eral regions - Central Mexico in North America and former Communist countries in Central 
Europe - a trend that accelerated in the 21st century (Brincks et al 2018), giving rise to what 
came to be known as the ‘integrated periphery’. Cheap labor, geographic proximity to large 
markets, membership in regional trade agreements, and investment incentives (Pavlínek 
2018, Mordue and Sweeney 2020; and the references cited in these papers) explain the 
growth of an automotive industry in these countries and the simultaneous restructuring in 
both traditional core regions and old integrated peripheries in Western Europe and North 
America6.  
There are similarities between the development of the automotive industries in Mexico and 
in the CEE (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia): they are both tightly linked to 
(or dependent upon) a powerful player and have recorded an impressive growth in produc-
tion, brought about by FDI lured by low wages and policy incentives. The German-EEC 
network grew thanks to the access of the Eastern countries to the European common market. 
Likewise, the growth of the Mexican automotive industry has been shaped by tariff agree-
ments with the US and Canada (Maquila first, then NAFTA since 1994, and now the US-
MCA). 
Between 1990 and 2015 in Eastern Europe an influx of automotive FDI in excess of E35 
billion led to growth in output from 797 thousand to 4.1 million cars (OICA 2018 quoted in 
Pavlínek 2020). The output of the supplier industry grew even faster with at least 1212 sup-
plier factories built by foreign investors between 1997 and 2016 (Pavlínek 2020). Similarly, 
a flow of over 23.2 billion dollars in new investments (announced or put to use) since 2013 
made Mexico the seventh largest vehicle manufacturer and the fourth largest exporter in the 
world (Negocios ProMéxico, 2015). Assembly firms’ requests for their most important mod-
ule and Tier-1 suppliers to be located close to assembly plants has led to the spatial restruc-
turing of the supplier base and its concentration close to the assembly plants (Klier and Ru-
binstein 2020), with a sustained growth in employment in the production of parts and com-
ponents (table 2). Compared to the US, Germany has offshored a higher share of production 
of components (the CEE + SEE accounts for 63.1 per cent of the total jobs in the production 
of components in the integrated macro-area against Mexico’s 53.8 per cent). Conversely, 
Germany has retained at home a higher share of employment in assembly. 
 
6 A similar, though more recent, trend is underway in East Asia, where Vietnam and Thailand are acquiring 
increasing importance in world production. 
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Table 2 - Employment in the automotive industry (vehicles and parts) 2016. (thousands) 








US 180.9 579.9 760.8 23.8 74.7 46.2 
Mexico 61.1 674.4 735.5 8.3 25.3 53.8 
Total 242.0 1254.3     
Germany 480.0 340.4 820.0 58.5 78.8 36.9 
CEE+SEE 129.0 583.0 712.0 18.1 21.2 63.1 
Germany +CEE 609.0 923.4     
Rest of Europe 1001.0 748.0 748.0 57.2   
Total Europe 1610.0 1671.4 3281.4 41.7   
Source: US and Mexico Klier and Rubenstein (2017, fn.2 p. 23)  
Germany (2017): Krzywdzinski (2019, p. 224), from VDA (Verband der Automobilindustrie) 2016 
https://www.vda.de/en/services/facts-and-figures/facts-and-figures-overview.html  
Notes: CEE + SEE (4 Visegrad countries + Romania) 
Governments’ strategy in the integrated periphery has been based, essentially, in checking 
wages and attracting FDI through fiscal concessions. According to Covarrubias (2020), Mex-
ican wages did not grow in the NAFTA era, despite employment growth and skills shortages. 
He notes that the same trend was recorded in the US and Canadian auto industries: over the 
same period wages fell from 36 to 27 dollars per hour in the US and from 34 to 26 dollars in 
Canada7. In 2018, Mexican wages in manufacturing were less than one fourth the US value 
(Carreto 2020), an issue that is taken up in the new North American free trade treaty (US-
MCA) (see following section). 
Figure 3 –Mexican wages and salaries in manufacturing: comparison with various countries 
 
Source: Carreto (2020) 
 
7 A study of the largest exporting economies conducted by The Boston Consulting Group (2014) indicates that 
since the beginning of the new century the United States and Mexico recorded the smallest growth (strictly 
negative) in wages with sustained production. Mexico is the most cost-competitive (i.e., low cost) manufactur-
ing country amongst the leading ten export economies, while the United States occupies the fourth place, after 
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As for the CEE periphery, in 2016, the median value of wages for production workers in 
Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary were around 27 per cent of the German peer 
group (€835 compared to €3,122).8 Strong wage increases in CEE characterized the period 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Wages in the CEE automotive industry rose during 
this period from about 8-10 per cent of the German level to about 20-25 percent (see Galgóczi 
2017 for national average wages). Between 2008 and 2016, this catching-up movement 
stalled, with wage increases in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland remaining below 
the increases in Germany when expressed in euros. Renewed wage dynamism in CEE after 
2016 has not, as yet, restored the pre-crisis momentum of wage catch-up: weak unions, de-
centralized collective bargaining systems, and locational competition inside and outside the 
CEE combined to restrain wage increases (Krzywdzinski, 2019).  
Competition over labor costs and governments’ incentives are an important driver of the dy-
namic nature of a nation’s competitive position within automotive production networks. The 
threat represented by lower-cost locations is used to kill wage increases across the entire 
production network. Delocalization, interplant competition and threats of relocation of pro-
duction put pressure on higher-wage core and semi-periphery countries. Similarly, as cost 
advantages get eroded, integrated peripheries too fall victim of the shift to new peripheries. 
With wages much lower than the CEE, Romania, Ukraine, Turkey, and North Africa are 
becoming important recipients of FDI, especially in labor-intensive low-skill automotive as-
sembly, such as the assembly of cable harnesses (Pavlínek et al, 2017). In turn, investment 
in low-cost regions offers only a temporary competitive advantage to the off-shoring firm, as 
other firms invest in similar locations, setting off the cumulative race to delocalize that 
spreads its effects on wage devaluation throughout the value chain. 
Core and semi-periphery 
In developed countries, the process of delocalization of production has caused concern over 
the future of established high-wage locations. Their firms attempted – with diverse suc-
cess - to counter the saturation of their markets by upgrading to premium vehicles and ex-
porting to the rapidly expanding markets of the emerging economies, while delocalizing the 
production of lower-value cars. If, as argued by Mordue and Sweeney (2020), for the inte-
grated periphery the question is how to upgrade to the semi-periphery, for the members of 
the core the question is how to retain their core-like status and avoid relegation to the semi-
periphery. 
Relocation to the East has put strong pressures on German and other core and semi-periphery 
countries’ production plants. Pavlínek (2020, 517-18) reports that between 1991 and 2017, 
 
8 There is a large variance within CEE. The lowest wages for production workers are usually paid by electronics 
and interior parts companies. At around €300-400 per month, they are just above the minimum wage level in 
the region and barely enough to survive. But wages can go up to 1400 euros in best-paying companies 
(Krzywdzinski 2019, 223). 
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the traditional European automotive industry core countries - with the exception of Germany, 
and to a lesser extent an increasingly semi-peripheral Britain - suffered steep declines in do-
mestic car production: France (-49%), Italy (-56%), Sweden (-24%), with the deepest de-
clines during the 2008–2009 economic crisis (figure 4). Between 2000 and 2017 also several 
older integrated peripheries suffered declines - Belgium (-63%), Portugal (-29%), the Neth-
erlands (-28%) (OICA, 2018). The declines in France and Italy compared to the growth in 
Germany can be partially attributed to the more extensive offshoring of car assembly by 
French and Italian automakers which, in turn, is related to a greater share of small cars in 
their product portfolio, as well as to Germany’s large exports of mostly premium cars to 
China (Celi et al, 2018).9 At the same time, German automakers offshored a greater propor-
tion of the production of components, especially to Eastern Europe, in order to benefit from 
its lower labor costs, attaining a more efficient intra-corporate division of labor. 
Figure 4 - Car production trends in Europe, including Turkey and Morocco, 1991-2017 
 
Source: Pavlínek (2020, p. 518) on data of the European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) (ERM, 2017). 
German locations were under great competitive pressure. Shifts in jobs to low-wage countries 
have resulted in concession bargaining at many automotive supplier locations to prevent re-
locations or to gain new products for the plant (Krzywdzinski 2019). Only locations with 
lead roles in introducing new products and technologies were able partially to escape cost 
competition and increase employment. Conversely, the large number of pure manufacturing 
plants without noteworthy innovation functions, that still exist in Germany in direct compe-
tition with low-wage locations, bear the pressure to lower wages, increase working hours, 
 
9 Pavlinek (2020, p. 514) refers to the increased production of luxury cars and a simultaneous decrease in the 
assembly of small cars in Germany, partially relocated to integrated peripheries after 1990, as an example of 
this strategy. By 2010, the share of small and compact cars produced abroad reached 67% for German and 72% 
for French automakers, while the assembly of 93% of the upper-medium and 96% of luxury cars took place in 
Germany (Danyluk, 2018). A different share of luxury cars may account for the different distribution of em-
ployment between the OEMs of the same country. Miller (2020b) reports that “Unlike Volkswagen, which has 
just 40 per cent of its workforce in Germany, more than half of Daimler’s 300,000 or so staff are based in its 
home country”. 
14 
intensify work processes and make them more flexible.10 Thus, behind the aggregate em-
ployment figures, an intense process of churning is taking place: Pavlínek (2020, p. 527) 
found that both large German and French automotive firms were shedding jobs in their home 
economies while creating the majority of new jobs abroad, mostly in the CEE. At the same 
time, domestic firms in the fiercely competitive supplier industry, which is increasingly dom-
inated by large TNCs and follow sourcing, are getting weaker. In order to survive, large West 
European suppliers have been forced to internationalize production by setting up factories in 
the integrated periphery to supply foreign assembly plants and to export directly from there. 
Often, the strategy at the corporate level may involve putting its plants located in different 
locations in competition with each other. For instance, decisions on awarding new models 
are being made more and more directly in the form of auctions between the company’s vari-
ous plants. When the interests of a country and the strategies of its flagship companies come 
into conflict, wage concessions, public incentives and veiled or open threats enter the nego-
tiations. 
Survival gets tougher for countries in the semi-periphery. The term defines wealthier auto-
motive-producing countries that, unlike “core” nations, lack (or have lost) a domestically 
headquartered automaker. Unlike integrated peripheries, semi-peripheries cannot rely on la-
bor cost advantages to retain their plants and employment, nor can they count, like core coun-
tries, on the benefits brought to the nation by its flagship companies. For economically ad-
vanced locations, a primary response to wage competition and deindustrialization lies in fo-
cusing on higher value-added activities and research and development. However, empirical 
studies on the automotive industry found that R&D tends to concentrate in locations proxi-
mate to corporate headquarters (Mordue and Sweeney 2017). Thus, for countries or regions 
lacking a global lead firm, generating R&D can be problematic. Moreover, because of do-
mestic political pressures, lead firms are more likely to close assembly factories in foreign 
locations than in their home countries, which makes the foreign-owned factories in semi-
peripheries more vulnerable to plant closure than domestic assembly plants in core regions 
(Pavlínek 2020, 514). Their weakness may also be passed on to their value chain of producers 
of parts and components, especially if they lose their close ties with major assemblers. Italy 
is, in some way, moving towards the semi-periphery. Between 1998 and 2018 it recorded a 
drop in the production of vehicles of 1.3 million, obliging suppliers of parts and components 
to increasingly rely on external production networks. As a consequence, the structure of em-
ployment changed drastically, from 40 per cent in parts and components and 52 per cent in 
final assembly in 1998 to 53 and 41 per cent respectively in 2018 (Gaddi 2020, p. 136). 
It is an open question whether the introduction of frontier technologies, such as those sup-
porting autonomous and electric vehicles (AV and EV), represents an opportunity for an in-
dustry revival or rather a threat of decline. In fact, the new players in digital innovation are 
 
10 See Krzywdzinski (2014) on the effects of de-localization on German labor industrial relations. 
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concentrated in places other than those of the traditional automotive industry. The strategy 
followed by OEMs to recover lost ground in these innovations is to enter into research part-
nerships with the innovators. However, recovery may be more difficult for producers in in-
tegrated and semi-peripheries, which lack the research centers that are usually located at 
OEM headquarters. The case study of Canada seems to suggest that “even though AV-related 
R&D has emerged from non-traditional automotive locations, the preponderance of AV-re-
lated R&D is converging in core automotive locations proximate to automakers’ global head-
quarters” (that is, in the Michigan region) (Mordue and Karmally 2020). 
Developmental vs dependent linkages  
The recent history of the automotive industry presents examples of successful up-grading 
from periphery to core status (South Korea, China) as well as examples of failed catching-up 
(Brazil, Mexico), and even of potential fall from core to semi-periphery (Canada, the UK, 
will Italy be next?). The analysis of the factors determining the prevalence – or the crea-
tion - of developmental over dependency linkages transcends the scope of this paper. Econ-
omists agree that developmental linkages are based on long-term collaboration between for-
eign subsidiaries and domestic firms that favor technology and knowledge transfer from for-
eign subsidiaries, encouraging the upgrading of domestic firms. Conversely, shorter-term, 
cost cutting and price-based relationships between foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms 
create dependent linkages, perpetuating the dependency of firms and regions on external ac-
tors (Coe and Yeung 2015; Pavlínek 2018). This distinction leaves the question of what 
makes for long-term collaborative links, or vice-versa, unanswered, calling into question the 
interaction between corporate strategies and states policies, as shaped by their relative power 
relations (as demonstrated by the Chinese case, Teece 2019). 
In 1950, Singer (1950, p. 474) warned that the entry of foreign capital into developing econ-
omies would create a dualism of the productive structure, that is, the co-existence of firms at 
very different levels of technology. Likewise, the economists of CEPAL emphasized the need 
for indigenous “technological densities” to avoid technological dependence, advocated a co-
ordinated policy of import substitution and export promotion; and stressed the role of the 
domestic market. Import substitution industrialization (ISI) and export-oriented industriali-
zation - they argued - are not two alternative models of development, as demonstrated by the 
East-Asian development strategy, incorrectly depicted as export oriented11. 
Both Mexico and the CEE behave as export platforms12, with an extremely narrow domestic 
market (saturated by imported secondhand cars). The issue of their capacity to transition to 
 
11 Zhu (2007, 1, 14) writes that the development strategies of Taiwan and China have always been a combination 
of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and export-oriented strategies. “Behind this strategy there is a set 
of institutions which has played a key role in supporting ISI, in particular, the government, the bank sector, 
public enterprises, and their relationship”. 
12 82 per cent of Mexico’s automotive production is exported, 84.5% of which goes to the US (Covarrubias 2020). 
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a more (self)-sustainable pattern of growth has become current again, as well as controver-
sial. Although the automotive industry in integrated peripheries is based on state-of-the-art 
factories and technologies, production, organization, and strategic functions are externally 
controlled through foreign ownership. Due to the rapid internationalization of the supplier 
industry, also the vast majority of suppliers in integrated peripheries are foreign subsidiaries 
that tend to assemble components or modules from imported parts or supplied by other for-
eign subsidiaries. Consequently, the existence of domestic suppliers and their capabilities are 
not important factors in the location decisions of foreign assembly firms.  
The creation of clusters - which bring together a multiplicity of suppliers and auxiliary ser-
vices around the main OEMs - the exceptional growth in production and exports, the direct 
and indirect creation of jobs, have been cited as indication of positive linkages13. However, 
in his analysis of the CEE integrated periphery, Pavlínek (2020, 530) concludes that “between 
2005 and 2016, the benefits of large FDI in the automotive industry did not significantly 
spread from foreign to domestic firms in the form of spill-overs (Pavlínek and Zızalova, 
2016; Pavlínek, 2018)”. He estimated that in Eastern Europe only 5% of jobs created were 
due to domestic firms and only about one-quarter of plants perform innovation tasks such as 
the introduction of new products and technologies (Krzywdzinski 2019). Overall, the recent 
literature on integrated peripheries in the CEE found little spill-over effects of foreign invest-
ments on domestic industry, highlighting the prevalence of a dependent type of development 
in the automotive industry. 
Digital transformation raises a further question about the future development of the automo-
tive industry in the CEE periphery. The period of rapid expansion of the CEE automotive 
industry related to the opening up of CEE to foreign trade and FDI in the 1990s and European 
Union membership in the 2000s has come to an end, coinciding with the 2008-2009 global 
economic crisis. Pavlínek et al. (2017, p. 6) observe that "although the FDI-driven develop-
ment of the CEE automotive industry has continued in the aftermath of the economic crisis, 
it is no longer predominantly based on building new greenfield factories but increasingly on 
consolidating the existing spatial structure of the automotive industry in the form of expand-
ing profitable investments through reinvestment." Also, investment in the components indus-
try is likely to continue at significantly lower levels than in the period prior to the 2008-2009 
economic crisis since automotive supplier networks are now already established in CEE (ibid. 
p. 10). The consolidation phase would require a much more selective functional upgrading 
of the CEE automotive industry, which is crucial for maintaining the competitiveness of the 
CEE automotive industry. Digital technologies may facilitate the further decentralization of 
advanced activities including engineering, design and software development across produc-
 
13 Bai et al. (2020, fn 5), for instance, write that “There exists a large body of work documenting the positive 
impact of trade and FDI on the development of the local intermediate inputs market and spill-over via backward 
linkages”. See the references quoted in the footnote. 
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tion networks, allowing integrated peripheries to accumulate technological and R&D activi-
ties that have been traditionally located in core, headquarters locations. Conversely, a pessi-
mistic view posits that Industry 4.0 technologies may undermine the key comparative ad-
vantage of peripheral producers - lower labor costs and labor flexibility – and automate some 
of the knowledge-intensive activities performed by engineers in production locations (Dra-
hokoupil 2020).  
Electric vehicles and autonomous driving may represent even greater risks for the productive 
structure of the CEE countries, which is particularly focused on engines, transmissions and 
mechanical parts. The challenge is to leverage the traditional tools – low labor cost and public 
incentives – to attract new foreign investment for the production of batteries, and the retool 
of the existing plants for the production of electric and autonomous vehicles. 
The issue is controversial in the case of Mexico. The insufficient development of the domes-
tic value chain, both in terms of coverage of the various stages and in terms of technological 
and qualitative capabilities, is emphasized by several authors (Carrillo 2018; Equipo Roma 
2019). It is argued that reliance on FDI for the development of the industry has insulated the 
foreign owned, technological advanced part from the rest of the value chain. In these condi-
tions, exports were not such a strong contributor to economic growth as maintained: domestic 
production did not substitute for imports. Continued dependence on imported parts meant 
that national suppliers could not be integrated into the value chain (Castellanos, 2010). The 
dependence of the Mexican automotive industry on the strategic decisions of global players 
(on the re-organization of the various segments of their GVCs) is considered a factor of great 
vulnerability, especially in a context of rapid change in the patterns of consumption, technol-
ogies and international trade agreements. 
In 2012, a case study of the supplier network in the automotive cluster led by Ford Motor 
Company in Hermosillo, Mexico (Contreras et al, 2012) found that a new trend of 
knowledge-intensive small local companies had emerged, providing higher value services 
and playing more important roles in the supply chain. Conversely, more recent studies (Car-
rillo 2018; Covarrubias 2020) based on exports data could not find positive effects, describ-
ing the Mexican automotive structure as a “pyramid without a base” (see fig. 5 in Carrillo 
2018). It is to be noted, however, that exports are a bad indicator when analyzing the magni-
tude of spill-over effects, since Tier-2 and Tier-3 firms are more likely to produce for the 
local market, supplying directly Tier-1 and Tier-2, which are the ones that ultimately export. 
An unequivocal answer can only come from production data (Table 3) and/or from direct 
surveys of the capabilities of the domestic structure. 
In the next section, we analyze the joint effects of the digital transformation and the new 
Treaty on Mexico’s domestic value chains. Our analysis is based on a series of interviews 
that we conducted in 2018 and 2019 with a number of Tier-1 and Tier-2 firms in Mexico.  
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Table 3 The size distribution of firms in the Mexican automotive sub-sectors  
 
Source: authors' elaboration on INEGI data base (INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 
(México), 2019), download 01/10/2019 
4. Impact of the new trade agreement and digital transformations on the Mexican sup-
ply chain 
Free Trade vs. regional blocs 
In recent years the automotive industry has been shaken by winds of trade war. From the 
repeal of NAFTA, to the imposition of tariffs on aluminum and steel, to the tariff war with 
China, and the threat of imposing tariffs on European exports of vehicles, there is no end in 
sight to the trade war launched by President Trump (and it is not certain that a change in the 
presidency will entail a radical change in US trade policy).14 On the European front, Brexit 
negotiations are fueling acrimony in inter-European relations and sowing uncertainty in 
firms’ strategies.  
Studies attempting to quantify the effects of restrictive trade policies find substantial trade 
and welfare losses due to the current close integration of production networks that amplify 
the adverse effects of protectionist policies, an argument made more compelling by the dis-
ruptions caused by Covid-19. Higher tariffs and trade wars may induce firms to shorten or 
otherwise reshape their global supply chains (Blanchard, 2019). Even seemingly small tariffs 
can substantially disrupt global value chains through the difference between nominal and 
effective tariff rates (which depend on the share of value added in the total value of the prod-
uct) and the relative costs of relocation and transhipment (Menon, 2019).  
The challenge to free trade involves threats and opportunities, differently distributed. Who 
bears the cost of such a trade war may vary according to the distribution of the valued added 
along the GVC. Tariffs on intermediate inputs may ultimately be borne by upstream produc-
ers in the country imposing the tariff, thus affecting the competitiveness of domestic firms 
 
14 For instance, Joe Biden has rolled out a ‘Made in America’ plan, pledging to penalize companies that move 
jobs overseas and reward business that employ people in the US, to woo voters in the industrial Midwest (re-
ported in the FT, September 10, 2020).  
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that have to import them.15 Similarly, some of the producer-side benefits from trade protec-
tion enjoyed by local import-competing firms may be passed along to foreign capital 
(Blanchard, 2019). However, if trade disputes are perceived as a symptom of an enduring 
geopolitical struggle for global economic dominance, they are likely to increase uncertainty. 
Strategic sourcing and foreign investment decisions of globally engaged firms require rea-
sonably certain and long-term perspectives.16 By increasing uncertainty, trade disputes, even 
if temporarily settled, are associated with a greater volatility in equity markets (Baker et al., 
2019) that may discourage investment. All things considered, and given the degree of inte-
gration between the US and the Mexican production plants - in 2019 Mexico accounted for 
more than 30% of total US imports of transport equipment - Trump’s threats of repealing the 
NAFTA Treaty without negotiating a new one were scarcely credible, dubbed as the “mere 
expression of a professional extortionist” (Castellanos, 2017). Trump's threat is scarcely 
credible also due to the ability of companies to circumvent the treaty constraints through 
cross-border accounting practices.  
Within the GVC model of production, costs and benefits of higher tariffs may extend well 
beyond the immediate ‘intentional’ targets, to include countries and companies around the 
world, including the very country that imposed the new protection at the outset. Given the 
complex calculation required by companies, which must respond to changes in the global 
economic landscape and the increasing uncertainty created by across the board trade disputes, 
there is good reason to believe that global firms may not respond the way the importing 
country wants or expects. 
Although the conclusion of the new Treaty (USMCA)17 brought relief among the Mexican 
companies and policy makers and raised optimism about prospects for new investment in-
flows, specifically in the automotive sector, to increase the share of regional content, its ef-
fects are far from certain (see the following section). All the main OEMs and their global 
Tiers-1, with the exception of Chinese companies, have already established plants in Mexico, 
 
15 The United Steelworkers union, which represents nearly one million US worker-members in manufacturing, 
metals, forestry and beyond – industries that employ workers up and down the value chain across myriad traded 
products – has been an outspoken critic of renegotiating NAFTA in general, and of the US steel and aluminum 
tariffs against Canada in particular (Blanchard 2019, 60-61). 
16 Brexit provides the most recent example. Nissan has announced a delay in the production of its flagship vehicle 
– Quashqai – to be produced at the Sunderland plant, until after the post-Brexit definition of trading rules 
(Campbell 2020). 
17 The USMCA agreement has a very detailed series of norms and time progression of requirements for the 
automotive industry. Among these are: rules of origin requirements, that mandate that 75% of an automobile's 
value must come from within the region (up from 62.55 under NAFTA), plus specific quotas for steel and 
aluminum, and certain components. Labor related measures include a minimum wage requirement: 40 to 45 
percent of the automobiles manufactured in North America must be made in factories that pay a minimum of 
$16 per hour on average. This measure will be phased in during the first five years after USMCA ratification. 
Finally, Annex 23-A requires Mexico to pass legislation that improves the collective bargaining capabilities of 
labor unions, to comply with the International Labour Organization's Convention 98 on freedom of association 
and collective bargaining.  
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located in spatial agglomerations in the Bajío's states and in some Northern states (Klier and 
Rubenstein, 2017). The question is whether the new, stricter conditions of the new Treaty 
will succeed in attracting new firms, diverting production from other developed or emerging 
economies. With OEMs’ plants in Mexico running below full capacity, and barring signifi-
cant changes in the composition of the US demand of passenger vehicles, it is reasonable not 
to expect a large flow of new investment from assemblers, with the possible notable excep-
tion of Chinese firms (Ortiz-Velasquez et al, 2019). The question then is how the new Treaty 
will affect suppliers. The increase in regional content is expected to set in motion a readjust-
ment in the global supply chains that could eventually benefit the local production of com-
ponents in Mexico, though its total net effects will depend on a number of factors. The first 
question concerns the domestic availability of crucial components (such as specialty steel 
and aluminum, engines, etc.) at the moment not produced domestically. The second question 
concerns the distribution of the increased production of parts and components between for-
eign firms (relocating part of the production from their plants abroad to Mexico) and Mexican 
Tier-2 and Tier-3 firms. A third possibility is represented by Tiers-1 reshoring production 
from their Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers unable to respond to (or certify conformity with) the 
requirements imposed by the Treaty. 
Products’ traceability  
The general goal of the USMCA is to increase the regional content of components of the 
vehicles produced in the region. In order to certify compliance with the USMCA require-
ments, the traceability of the products across the production processes along the entire supply 
chain becomes crucial,18 making essential also communication flows within the supply chain. 
That traceability is a critical issue, not only for compliance with the Treaty, appears obvious 
if one considers that the biggest transformation in the automotive industry has been the ver-
tical disintegration of production, with the decentralization of products in modules coordi-
nated by Tiers-1. When entering the lean production model, firms must introduce many 
changes in the production lines (special vacuum cleaning of components and packaging, 
among others) and products must be fully certified in order for the assembler to use those 
 
18 Traceability is the capacity to verify the history, location or status of an item by means of documented identi-
fication. The first step towards complete, end-to-end visibility across supply chains requires merging serializa-
tion – that is, assigning unique identifiers to products as diverse as consumer goods and complex medical de-
vices – with smart manufacturing and traceability. As products are tracked, they acquire a ‘pedigree’, which 
provides a wealth of information to companies and consumers. Disruptive technologies, such as artificial intel-
ligence, the Internet of Things, block chain and collaborative platforms, can take traceability systems to a higher 
level, offering detailed reports on any product’s status and movements and creating direct links between the 
various stakeholders along the supply chain, from producers to end users. Traceability analyzes what goes well 
or wrong and assesses the efficiency of the entire supply chain process with data management and analytics, 
right up to the point of sale to the final consumer, and beyond. Using data-centric traceability systems, stake-
holders can share collected data and cross-reference information with connected systems anywhere in the supply 
chain. Fraunhofer IOSB (2018).  The adoption of these new technologies involves the delicate problem of own-
ership and control of data, with obvious implications for the distribution of power within the value chain. 
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components in its production line. These changes call for a general increase in the demand 
for devices and processes to secure effective traceability.  
An essential step is represented by the digital twin of production processes,19 which is ex-
pected to be the frontier of digital technologies. It is usually referred to as the digital version 
of the production process that is developed and enhanced for product and process planning. 
However, in the companies that we visited in 2018, we observed that digital twin was used 
the other way around, that is, to obtain a digital representation of the ongoing production 
process which the company could use for simulation and optimization of its internal organi-
zation of production. Firms had added sensors along the many stages of their production 
processes to control operations and to have a digital representation of the analogic steps of 
the transformations (pressing, assembling, …); data could then be processed to optimize pro-
duction flows, input consumption, labor utilization, maintenance planning, and so on. 
Making traceability effective by the adoption of digital technologies could start a sweeping 
transformation across the entire supply chain. It may represent an efficient support to Tiers-
1 and Tiers-2 in certifying their compliance with the Treaty’s requirements, in achieving 
quality control of products and ensuring the flexibility in the just-in-time programing of the 
flow of products.  
Fulfilment of the requirements of the USMCA - in terms of regional origin of components, 
level of wages, percentage of steel from the region, and so on – supports, or requires, the 
transformation of the technologies within the company. In this sense, product traceability is 
considered a driving channel to digital transformation (RIETI and Motohashi, 2017; World 
Economic Forum, 2019). The question is whether Tiers-2 and Tiers-3 will be able to plan the 
transformation of their organization to keep up with digital transformation. Companies una-
ble to keep the pace of traceability risk losing their customers. The managers of a Tier-1 
company we interviewed stated that they were ready to comply with the requirements (origin, 
labor, steel) in the short-medium term and, if needed, they would internalize the production 
processes that their Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers were unable to certify. However, once it has 
been reshored, production may not necessarily be outsourced again. 
Digital technologies can also provide better quality control and a more fluid flow of infor-
mation across the supply chain, improving the quality of the products, and enhancing process 
and product innovation, cost benefits that are passed on to their customers. In fact, most 
innovation is grounded within the factories, in the shop floor. Quality control of products, 
cost reductions and product improvements are obtained from suppliers producing compo-
nents in a better way, changing the component design, the material inputs, the processes.  
Finally, digital technologies could provide the flexibility required to optimize the production 
process without relying solely on labor flexibility, which has been, so far, the main source of 
 
19 See Fraunhofer IOSB (2018) for a collection of essays about the present and potential application of digital 
twin, from its first definition by NASA in 2010 to Industry 4.0. 
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adjustment (more shifts, work on Saturday and the weekend). Labor flexibility is no longer 
enough, since the present organization of production requires flexibility and control over all 
inputs to meet prompt delivery requirements and reduce costs: cost reduction can come from 
better inventories management and better and timely information, adjustment and compli-
ance with the daily or weekly changes that their customers might require to improve customer 
services. Flexibility is mandated by the just-in-time, lean production organization of the en-
tire vertical chain, which must respond in real time to information provided by the dealers in 
the car markets. Within this scheme, the burden of adjustment is shifted down the value chain, 
from the OEMs to Tiers-1, and from these to their Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers.  
The intensity and methods of application of digital technology differ not only between coun-
tries, sectors, and companies, but also within companies. Digital transformation is local. In 
our interviews we observed that smart factories presented different degrees of overall inte-
gration within the company and in the value chain. While foreign companies work with the 
latest technology, there is a great number of small domestic, lower-tier producers that have 
difficulty in grasping the opportunities opened by the technology and equip themselves with 
the required competences and organization, a problem common also in developed countries, 
as their governments are well aware.20  
Obstacles to the digital path 
To meet the challenges of the new trade agreement and digital transformation, changes are 
needed in several interrelated domains that go beyond traceability: labor up-skilling, energy 
and digital infrastructure, logistics and integrated modernization of transports.  
The Mexican automotive industry is concentrated in a few clusters, built around OEM and 
Tier-1 foreign firms. In these enclaves (that include other advanced engineering sectors) a 
thick network of firms and institutions may provide the humus on which innovations thrive, 
with spill-over effects across sectors. But new technologies require new competences. This 
is where Mexican firms can face the most serious obstacles. In the automotive clusters, re-
taining skilled/trained workers was considered one of the most pressing problems. However, 
in our interviews, we met teams led by young people, with up-to-date competences acquired 
in universities, polytechnics and technical institutions, testifying to the great effort underway 
to prepare for the digital transformation.21 We also observed the great number of women 
working at the assembly lines and as quality control managers. Yet only medium to large 
companies had the resources to internally provide training and desired services for work-
family balance that a minimal public welfare cannot provide.  
 
20 In Germany, for instance, the national industrial plan of Industrie 4.0 (BMBF, 2013) has spurred a series of 
policy programs to support SMEs all over the country, with almost 50 innovation intermediaries (Digital Hubs 
and Competence Centers) specifically targeting the needs of SMEs in the digital transformation. 
21 A group of students in the Polytechnic University is producing its own electrical car. They are just assembling 
what has been invented and designed elsewhere, but also simply copying requires mastering the technology. 
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The automotive production process uses the territory heavily. In the automotive clusters all 
over the Bajío' states and the Northern states of Cohauila and Chihuahua, (Mexico Industrial 
Maps 2018), auto parts suppliers are concentrated close to their customers, 200 kilometers 
away at most. In the Mexico-US-Canada corridors, transport costs are kept low by over-
loading trucks that cannot be used in the US any longer and by exploiting drivers with long 
driving days. Transport infrastructure is overwhelmed by overloaded trucks and long queues. 
The poor state of transportation makes for a long journey to work.22 
The direction of the new technological developments is still very uncertain. Being designed 
to serve the US market, Mexico’s productive structure and its development reflect the evo-
lution of US demand and policies, i.e. not yet very responsive to the green transition. Discus-
sions of transition to electric vehicles and new mobility has just started. Some manufacturers 
of light motor vehicles installed in Mexico have announced investments in production lines 
of e-vehicles. Meanwhile, the federal government has reduced the tariffs on imports of some 
e-vehicles to support their demand.23 The new development in mobility may represent a se-
rious challenge for the supply chain, strongly tilted towards producing engines and transmis-
sions. Thus, transition to a sustainable industry cannot be left entirely to the (foreign) market. 
The government must act now to assist the development of the complementary assets related 
to electric vehicles: from the efficient and environmentally friendly production and distribu-
tion of electricity to supporting demand for electric vehicles, to influencing mobility patterns. 
Environmental regulation and safety travel conditions could support the transition to new 
vehicles and foster internal production, reducing the dependence on exports (as is happening 
in Europe and in China), with spill-over effects on the supply chain of components and other 
sectors of the economy.  
5. The challenges ahead 
Increasing competition, digital disruptions, new technologies related to connectivity, auton-
omy, sharing and electrification (CASE) threaten the established structure of the automotive 
industry and the comparative advantage of the countries in the macro-regions. Competition 
in saturated markets has forced OEMs to transform production processes to contain costs and 
better meet customer demands, increasing product variety and shortening production cycles. 
At the same time, the race to electric vehicles (EV) and autonomous vehicles (AV) demands 
huge investments entailing big risks. Leading manufacturers and automotive companies are 
responding to the mounting risks by forming new kinds of strategic alliances.  
Traditionally companies opted for M&A when looking to enter new markets, gain economies 
of scale or access new capabilities. Aware that the automotive industry, especially in the mass 
 
22In cross border commuting from Mexico City DF to any locality in the surrounding Mexico State, for instance, 
passengers have to change to a different company running the service in the other state. Transport regulation 
could make commuting easier, breaking local monopolies, enhancing competition and obtaining better services.  
23 https://www.opportimes.com/tariffs-on-imports-of-electric-cars-eliminated/ 
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market, would have to restructure - concentrate in a few large groups, share knowledge, pro-
cesses, costs and risks, and take advantage of technological convergence - they engaged in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and horizontal alliances, while structuring vertical net-
works with suppliers. Either bringing together firms with complementary differences or pool-
ing together firms with supplementary similarities, these new groups shaped the global auto-
motive industry into distinct strategic blocks that became a basis for competition within the 
industry (Trezzini Matta 2016). 
Software giants: partners or competitors? 
In recent years, the speed of disruption, the need to make bets on multiple products, services, 
sectors and technologies, the sheer size of the investments involved, and the uncertainty of 
the outcomes, meant that strategic alliances - whereby two independent companies remain 
separate entities but share resources or collaborate on projects for their mutual benefit - have 
become an increasingly attractive and flexible alternative. Thus, we “have seen a shift in 
alliance archetypes away from familiar horizontal alliances towards cross-sector strategic 
alliances – mainly with technology companies, as a means of accessing new disruptive tech-
nologies” (Weber-Rymkovska et al. 2017, p. 4). At the same time, traditional M&A activity 
has shifted towards acquiring innovative technology start-ups (Figure 5).24 This trend has 
further accelerated in the most recent years, and especially after Covid-19. The press reports 
news of consolidation and partnership deals taking place on an almost daily basis – 
Volkswagen and Argo, Hyundai and Aptiv, Fiat Chrysler and Waymo (Google’s self-driving 
unit) are but a few recent examples of the deals signed in autonomous driving - with similar 
deals in electric vehicles, batteries, hydrogen fuel cells, sharing and mobility. 
Tier-1 suppliers are also deeply involved in forging alliances with companies that were not 
traditionally engaged in the automotive industry. In fact, in the present organization of global 
value chains, the definition of the technological solutions has been passed on to the compo-
nent suppliers. They are the ones on the forefront of technology changes: they develop pro-
prietary technologies in continuous dialogue with the manufacturers and take responsibility 
for incorporating new technologies in the production process (Gaddi and Garbellini 2019, p. 
69). 
 
24 The number of cross-sector alliances (involving the top 15 auto companies) has grown dramatically in recent 
years, from just a small number between 1998-2007 to13 in the first 9 months of 2017 alone, taking the total to 





Figure 5 – Changing alliances landscape in automotive industry 1998-2017 
Based on the top 15 players and including selected examples from KGM's database 
 
Source: Weber-Rymkovska et al. (2017). 
Computers on wheels 
As regions and players outside the traditional automotive set are gaining momentum, and a 
wave of technological trends is redefining mobility, the core competencies for future success 
are changing rapidly. The automotive product is changing: electronics and software play a 
major part and represent a significant share of the value of the vehicle. Changes in production 
processes require skills that have not, so far, been among the core competencies of automo-
tive engineering and disrupt the fully integrated global supply chain model. The increasing 
relevance of (big) data and IT devices may shift the power from OEMs and suppliers to high-
tech and IT players.  
Microsoft, for instance, has entered separate partnerships with five of the main car-makers 
(VW, Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi, BMW, Daimler and Ford, that account for more than a 
third of global car production) to provide a fully connected vehicle platform that extends 
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beyond over-the-air updates. According to Tara Prakriya, general manager of Azure mobility, 
the automotive arm of Microsoft’s cloud division, “Microsoft’s approach is to build trust 
with carmakers, supply them with technology and not compete with them” (McGee 2020). 
According to this narrative, Microsoft’s role is to build the tools to help its partners find new 
revenues streams.25 This may not be the general strategy. According to Axel Schmidt, direc-
tor of Accenture’s global automotive practice, “They [Microsoft] are clearly focused on the 
back end and will never compete with the car producers… When you read the statements of 
[Amazon cloud unit] AWS and Google, it’s a bit different [because] they are taking a disrup-
tive, revolutionary approach, believing that there will be a significant market outside of the 
traditional carmakers” (McGee 2020). 
These trends are likely to affect the distribution of profits between the various players, the 
quantity and quality of employment, and the fortunes of countries and regions. Public policies 
attempt to reduce dislocations and affect the level and localization of new investment through 
subsidies, tariffs or political pressures. 
New core-periphery clusters? China, Silicon Valley, Europe 
Electric mobility is developing at a rapid pace. In 2018, the global electric car fleet exceeded 
5.1 million, up 2 million from the previous year and almost doubling the number of new 
electric car registrations (IEA 2019). With Covid-19 the trend accelerated beyond expecta-
tions.  
The People’s Republic of China is the world’s largest electric car market. In spite of having 
one of the stricter policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, EU car makers have been slow 
in responding. In turn, in spite of the US bland policy towards green conversion, Tesla is 
currently the world’s largest producer of BEVs (368,000 units in 2019), followed by the 
Chinese company BYD Auto (195,000 units in 2019). Until recently Tesla had one main 
production center in California, but it now also has a $5 billion factory in Shanghai and is 
building a factory in Berlin (Morgan 2020). 
All the major manufacturers have or are launching BEV models. There are also investment 
plans for battery manufacturing, where the EU delay is particularly severe, and which is cur-
rently dominated by East-Asian companies - LG Chem and Samsung in South Korea, CATL 
in China and Panasonic in Japan. In May 2018 the European Union “adopted the Strategic 
Action Plan for Batteries, that brings together a set of measures to support national, regional 
and industrial efforts to build a battery value chain in Europe, embracing raw material ex-
traction, sourcing and processing, battery materials, cell production, battery systems, as well 
as reuse and recycling” (IEA 2019, p. 74). Public funding aimed at encouraging risk-taking 
 
25 “The bigger opportunity for carmakers is generating recurring revenue streams from new services – most of 
which do not yet exist. It is here, says Sanjay Ravi, head of Microsoft’s automotive strategy, where Microsoft’s 
non-compete strategies should pay off” (McGee 2020). 
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and investment in research and innovation in this field can be provided in derogation of the 
European state aid rules. Germany and France committed to fund battery production, to sup-
port the battery value chain and to enhance industrial co-operation for the production of bat-
tery cells. 
With electronics and software playing a major part in the value of the vehicle, the automotive 
industry is attracting new investors from outside the industry – such as tech companies, ven-
ture capital and private equity players. These players dominate the investment in automotive 
and mobility start-ups. McKinsey (2019, p. 12) reports that since 2010, more than EUR 100 
billion have been invested in mobility start-ups, of which 94 per- cent originated from players 
outside of the automotive industry. The mergers and acquisition (M&A) volume in automo-
tive tech start-ups reached EUR 39 billion in the US and EUR 26 billion in Asia-Pacific 
between 2014 and 2017. Investments from VC/PE players are mostly focused on the US and 
Asia, with Europe falling behind. The report forecasts that profits will shift even more to-
wards new technologies and services, with more than 80 percent of the industry profit pool 
originating from CASE technologies and new business models. The question of employment 
is key in the transformation of the auto industry. Although the effects of automation on low-
skilled labor may have been overstated (Pardi et al. 2020), electronics and software define a 
completely new product, requiring new components and new skills that have not, so far, been 
among the core competencies of automotive engineering. Thus, advances in electrification 
and automation may bring changes in the quality and the location of jobs gained and lost that 
go well beyond the automotive sector. “Based on the findings of the 2018 Fraunhofer IAO 
study “ELAB 2.0,” alternative powertrains are less labor intensive than conventional com-
bustion engines due to lesser complexity and a higher share of automation in production and 
assembly. With PHEV and BEV accounting for 40 percent of the powertrain mix in 2030, 
electrification could result – depending on the vertical integration of today’s automotive 
OEMs and suppliers in e-mobility – in a net impact of 0.3 million fewer direct and indirect 
manufacturing jobs in Europe in 2030 compared to 2018” (quoted in McKinsey 2019, p. 32). 
The loss of jobs may be disastrous for integrated peripheries, though it will not spare core 
countries.  
Cuts in wages and jobs started well before the Covid-19 outbreak and continued afterwards, 
with both OEMs and main suppliers in the US and Europe announcing jobs cuts, renegotia-
tion of agreements with trade unions, closure or relocation of plants. The fall in demand in 
traditional markets and the need to invest massively in new markets, products, and technol-
ogies, has put OEMs under severe pressure to gain flexibility and cut costs. The burden of 
cutting costs has fallen on suppliers and labor. Parts producers have borne the brunt of the 
adjustment. This may suggest how one might interpret Daimler CEO’s statement that: “we 
adjusted our production so quickly that in spite of Covid-19 we lowered our inventory and 
had a better working capital balance at the end of June than we had at the end of March” 
(Miller 2020b). 
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Batteries vs fuel cells: Rival or complementary technologies? 
Among clean/renewable energy technologies, fuel cells are increasing in importance for elec-
tric vehicles.  
After having invested for years in battery electric vehicles (with electricity for charging bat-
teries produced by nuclear plants), the Chinese Government, in April 2019shifted the incen-
tives from that technology to the production of hydrogen. The Financial Subsidy Policy for 
the Promotion and Application of New Energy Vehicles now includes fuel cell technology 
and small unit production of hydrogen (see the policy release 138/2019) (Russo 2019, p. 
244), a solution appropriate for countries that have dispersed locations of activities and resi-
dential areas. 
The EU countries have massively subsidized the demand for electric vehicles and the pro-
duction of batteries. Recently, the European Commission EC (2020) has singled out clean 
hydrogen as one of the essential areas to address in the context of the energy transition, iden-
tifying a number of possible avenues to support it. The EC estimates that Europe is highly 
competitive in clean hydrogen technologies manufacturing and is well positioned to benefit 
from a global development of clean hydrogen as an energy carrier. France and Germany have 
already earmarked 9 billion euros each for investment in fuel cell technology. This move 
meets with strong opposition to hydrogen within the car-making sector, on the argument that 
hydrogen technology is too complex and expensive. Indeed, faced with ever-stricter EU 
emissions regulation, car makers have already started huge investment in battery technology, 
and have accelerated the production of electric and hybrid vehicles both to avoid the large 
fines for non-compliance with EU emissions rules, and to take advantage of the huge stimulus 
packages announced by European governments to subsidize the purchase of EVs. Sunk costs 
plus the urgency to meet demand mean that they cannot afford to wait until the hydrogen 
technique becomes more affordable and less uncertain. Conversely, the EC’s new drive for 
hydrogen is backed by Germany’s mechanical engineering sector. It claims that the German 
industry already has “the necessary expertise for electrolysis and hydrogen storage… but 
needs solid commitments from the government to attract the necessary investment” (Miller 
2020b). Hydrogen offers a unique opportunity to bridge the gap accumulated in battery tech-
nology vis-à-vis Asian countries across the entire value chain.  
The games are still open. Technologies are still relatively new; the costs of production are 
high, as is uncertainty over future developments. Given the current state of technology, hy-
drogen is not yet competitive for passenger cars, but fuel cells can be used for trucks, buses, 
and industrial use: as production goes up, the cost of electrolysis goes down, making it com-
petitive with electric cars.  
 
6. Open questions 
The automotive industry has been one of the most important growth engines for the devel-
oped countries of Europe and North America. After its first revolution, which unleashed a 
wave of delocalizations that resulted in a hierarchical regionalization of production and trade, 
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it is now facing its second transformation. Competition is no longer between the traditional 
players, but extends beyond the automotive sector, to include batteries, software, connection, 
mobility. The rise of new competitors from emerging economies and would-be entrants from 
other sectors which compete in mastering the new digital and software technologies, threat-
ens the established structure of the industry and the comparative advantage of countries.  
The competencies of incumbents are no longer sufficient to master the digital innovation. 
Since R&D in the new software and digital technologies are mostly developed in regions 
other than those dominated by OEMs, even the automotive industry’s old core that based its 
supremacy in engineering excellence risks losing ground. If the car follows the destiny of the 
computer, where the value is increasingly in the software, a redistribution of profits across 
sectors is very likely. 
As far as technologies in renewable energy and the development of EV are considered, they 
are still in their infancy. Trying to bridge the gap with South-Asian competitors, European 
OEMs have already committed large sums in the battery technology. Meanwhile, govern-
ments are encouraging investments in various technologies, including hydrogen. Competi-
tion between technologies make for an uncertain scenario, leaving room for the role of the 
state in coordinating and governing the change. 
Public policy will also be needed because supply chains will be hit particularly hard, recently 
due to the extensive lockdown to cope with COVID-19 pandemic, impacting on suppliers 
with different intensities, and to the shift to electric batteries, which will result in a drastic 
reduction in the number of components. UBS has appraised that while the engine of a VW 
Golf contains 113 moving parts, the equivalent section of an electric Chevrolet Bolt has three: 
producers of parts for traditional engines risk being cast out (Campbell 2020). And as Thor-
sten Muschal, president of Clepa, which represents automotive suppliers in Europe, said: "the 
changes are far wider than simply the long-term phase-out of traditional engine makers" 
(ibid.). Semi-peripheries and integrated peripheries, that specialize in the supply of “tradi-
tional” product, may suffer more.  
The current automotive transition is likely to open the way to a new restructuring of the 
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Table A1 - Percentage of trade flows by commodity and by group, in the years 1993, 2003, 2013, 2017. 
Groups are listed in decreasing order of their share of export in 1993. Commodities are listed according to their SITC code  
 
